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Food Norms and Preferences in Schools: is there Pluralistic Ignorance? 
 
Abstract 
We use behavioural games to identify preferences, beliefs about others’ preferences, and higher-order 
beliefs, amongst adolescents at a UK comprehensive school. Pupils systematically under-rate the 
attractiveness of ‘healthy’, and over-rate that of ‘unhealthy’, foods. The bias is consistently in the 
direction of higher-order beliefs. Pluralistic ignorance would explain much of the results and seems 
clearly instantiated in one case. 
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1. Introduction 
Schoolchildren’s diets are often seen as poor even in many affluent societies, with problems including 
an under-consumption of fruit and vegetables and over-consumption of processed items (Liu, 2013; 
Kim et al., 2014). Schools may face a dilemma, since they may wish to improve diets but also need to 
maintain revenue and avoid waste. If schools simply change menus towards healthier foodstuffs, 
takings may fall as pupils buy food elsewhere or take packed lunches with low nutritional quality 
(Evans et al. 2010). Understanding the factors guiding children’s food choices is therefore important 
for supporting healthier diets. 
In a recent review, Higgs (2015) finds that social norms are a powerful influence on food 
choice. “Food norms” constitute implicit rules about appropriate eating behaviour. They are thought 
to influence food choice through motivations for affiliation, acceptance and group identification, and 
provide information about appropriate quantities and food items (Higgs, 2015; Robinson et al., 2014). 
For adolescents, peer group norms are particularly important because during this period peers 
become a more salient reference group and teens experience a more intense need for peer approval 
and group acceptance (Bradford, 2004; Gardner and Steinberg, 2005; Collins and Steinberg, 2006). 
Moreover, adolescents themselves have reported peer norms influencing eating (Holmberg et al., 
2016; Stead et al., 2011; Stevenson et al., 2007), and recent studies find associations between their 
reported diets and the perceived behaviour of peers (Lally et al., 2011; Stok et al., 2012, 2014).  
Evidence also suggests, however, that children misperceive the dietary choices of their peers, 
underestimating their average intake of healthy foods (Lally et al. 2011; Di Noia and Cullen, 2015). A 
possible explanation is an influence of social norms on perceived intake. This may take the form of 
“pluralistic ignorance”, meaning that a food norm is falsely believed to be generally internalised. But 
it is not well-understood what food norms exist amongst schoolchildren, and how these compare to 
individual preferences and beliefs. Lally et al. (2011) note that conventional surveys may be defective 
to elicit children’s norms because of the cognitive difficulty of reporting on what others generally 
think.  
We sample children at a UK comprehensive school. We use a questionnaire to elicit 
preferences, incentivised guessing games to elicit first order beliefs about others’ preferences, and 
incentivised coordination games to elicit higher order expectations constitutive of norms. We keep 
the survey format and rating scale identical across treatments, varying only the initial question asked. 
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A cost of this approach is that we do not distinguish operationally between injunctive norms, that is, 
how socially acceptable foods are amongst peers, and descriptive norms, that is, stereotypical 
preferences. Advantages are that potential for demand effects across treatments is minimised, and 
that the response distributions can be straightforwardly compared.  
 
2. Experimental Design 
We deploy a questionnaire, with items comprising conventionally healthy and unhealthy foodstuffs. 
We use a 4-point, ordinal, desired frequency scale: 
1 =  “something I don’t want to have at all,”  
2 = “something I don’t want to have often” 
3 = “something I want to have from time to time” 
4 = “something I want to have often” 
The same questionnaire is administered under three conditions.  In “Coordinate”, pupils state 
what the most common response will be. A pre-announced prize is awarded for the most correct 
answers. Since the other respondents are also attempting to give the most common response, this 
constitutes a ‘pure coordination game’ (Mehta et al 1994; Bardsley et al. 2010), with multiple identical 
Nash equilibria. Coordination games have been used to identify social norms, on the grounds that the 
shared expectations that constitute norms are what enable subjects’ responses to converge (Krupka 
and Weber, 2013; Burks and Krupka 2013; Gächter et al. 2013). We operationalise the norm as the 
mode, since this constitutes the correct answer. In “Answer”, pupils are asked simply to state their 
own preferred intake for each item.   
In “Guess”, pupils guess what the most common response has been in Answer, again with a 
pre-announced prize.  The Guess condition elicits beliefs concerning others’ preferences. Unbiased 
beliefs imply the same mode here and in Answer.  
We test the following hypotheses: 
1) modal choice is the same in Guess and Answer 
2) modal choice is the same in Answer and Coordinate 
Since distinct food items are considered, and distinct configurations of preferences, beliefs 
and norms may exist in relation to a given food item independently of others, we test 1) and 2) for 
each item separately, rather than in an aggregate test. Pluralistic ignorance requires 1) and 2) to be 
rejected, since 1) characterises unbiased beliefs about preferences and 2) characterises an 
internalised norm. Alternatively, one might theorise in the manner of standard microeconomics that 
expectations are rational, and that responses in Coordinate and Guess derive from unbiased 
expectations about responses in Answer. In that case hypotheses 1) and 2) would stand. 
For each hypothesis and each food item, we observe whether the modes of the distributions 
coincide. Since no formal hypothesis test of modal coincidence exists, we deploy a two-sided non-
parametric test of central tendency to judge formally whether the responses are drawn from the same 
distribution. A test of central tendency retains the ordinal information in the rating scale, whereas a 
categorical test would not. We reject a hypothesis if two modes diverge and the test statistic is 
significant (following Bardsley et al., 2010).  
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3. Procedures 
We surveyed 54 children aged 14-15 at a North of England comprehensive school in 2015, under two 
protocols. In the first (N=30) pupils responded under Answer followed by Guess conditions, and in the 
second (N=24) Coordinate followed by Answer. Guess and Coordinate were incentivised using £10 
music store vouchers. 6 items were included typically regarded as healthy and 6 as less healthy. A 
question was also included on whether children were influenced by peers in their food choices.1 All 
surveys were paper-based and communication was not allowed. Each pupil marked another child’s 
script for a subset of the questions, to determine winners in the Guess and Coordinate condition. Data 
collection was via anonymous survey sheets in all cases, but the most common responses were 
established by a show of markers’ hands for the purpose of awarding prizes.  
 
4. Results  
Frequency distributions of responses are shown for ‘healthy’ and ‘unhealthy’ items in Figure 1 below. 
A broadly consistent pattern is evident, whereby norms are positive (rating 3 or 4) for ‘unhealthy’, and 
negative (1 or 2) for ‘healthy’, food items, whereas modal preferences are sometimes positive for 
healthy and negative for unhealthy items. The attractiveness of healthy items is systematically under-
rated and that of unhealthy items is over-rated. 
Generally, modes differ between Answer and Guess (9/12 cases), and Answer and Coordinate 
(8/12 cases). Differences in modes, and test statistics, are summarised in Table 1 below. Statistically, 
it is debatable in the context of Table 1 whether to apply an adjustment for multiple comparison 
(Perneger, 1998, Mayo and Cox, 2006). We present the table with and without such adjustment, but 
concentrate on the adjusted values to avoid false positives.2  
Hypothesis 1 is rejected at or below 5% corrected significance in 7/12 cases, and hypothesis 2 
is rejected in 2/12 cases.  With one exception the signs of modal differences are reversed across the 
healthy and unhealthy items. Food norms are, with the same exception, consistent with the direction 
of bias: where the norm is positive (negative), popularity is over (under)-rated.  
From Table 1, pluralistic ignorance is observed for cakes, in that both hypotheses are rejected 
at the 5% level or below, and the direction of bias is in the direction of the norm. In a further 6 cases, 
results are directionally consistent with pluralistic ignorance but either or both comparisons lack 
statistical significance after correcting for multiple comparison.  It should be noted that sample sizes 
in the current study are small. 
  
                                                          
1 The questionnaire also included items not reported here which did not have a focus on social norms in relation 
to healthy and unhealthy foods. These included items designed to test which foods were salient in a non-
normative sense, to elicit attitudes towards ‘food bullying’, and items trialling alternative rating scales. For full 
details see the Appendix. We report Question 5 with the exception of one item (home-made beef burger) which 
is neither conventionally healthy nor unhealthy.  
2 We apply Hochberg´s ´step–up´ procedure, which ranks among the highest power adjustments and is robust 
to positive correlation, treating the healthy and unhealthy items as distinct families. This renders the 4 results 
from Table 1 with p-values in the range 0.016 < p < 0.05 non-significant.  
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Figure 1: Frequency distributions of rating scale responses 
Notes 
1. 0 = Answer; 1 = Coordinate; 2 = Guess 
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 Item Norm 
(Coordinate 
mode) 
Modal 
Change 
Guess - 
Answer 
Modal 
Change 
Coordinate 
- Answer 
Guesses 
Under: Over 
Modal 
Answer 
‘Healthy’ 
Items 
 
A veggie burger 
 
 
1 
 
0 
(0.16) 
 
0 
(0.56) 
 
n/a 
 
A glass of carrot 
juice 
 
1 
 
0 
(0.14) 
 
0 
(0.03) 
 
n/a 
 
A glass of milk 
 
 2 
 
-1 
(.03) 
 
-1 
(.58) 
 
21:1 
 
A portion of  
cooked 
vegetables 
 
2 
 
-0.5 
(.01)* 
 
0 
(.18) 
 
13:4 
 
 
An apple 
 
2 
 
-1 
(.00)* 
 
-1 
(.49) 
 
23:2 
 
A salad with 
lettuce & 
cucumber 
 
2 
 
-2 
(.00)* 
 
-1 
(.04) 
 
24:1 
 
‘Less 
Healthy’ 
Items 
 
A microwave 
ready meal 
 
2 
 
+1 
(.10) 
 
0 
(.33) 
 
3:17 
 
 
A large fizzy 
drink 
 
4 
 
+1.5 
(.00)* 
 
+1.5 
(.03) 
 
1:29 
 
 
A large slice of 
cake 
 
4 
 
+1 
(.00)* 
 
+1 
(.01)* 
 
6:16 
 
 
Tomato ketchup 
 
3 
 
+2 
(.00)* 
 
+1 
(.11) 
 
3:19 
 
 
Chips 
 
4 
 
+1 
(.00)* 
 
+1 
(.08) 
 
0:21 
 
 
A beef burger 
(fast food chain) 
 
4 
 
0 
(.00)* 
 
+1 
(.00)* 
 
3:13 
 
Table 1: differences in mode, and changes in central tendency 
Notes:  
1. For bi-modal distributions, the “mode” is defined as the mid-point between the two modes 
2. Uncorrected p-values in parentheses are for the 2-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test for Answer vs. 
Guess (N=30) and Answer vs. Coordinate (N=24). * indicates significance at 5% level or below after 
applying Hochberg´s (1988) procedure for multiple comparison.  
3. Figures are in bold wherever (corrected) p<0.05 and there is a difference in mode 
4. The ratio of over- to under-estimates of desired intake in column 4 is only informative when the 
distribution of preferences has an interior mode (value 2 or 3), since exterior modes necessitate 
errors in one direction only. 
 6 
 
 
For a second measure of biases in beliefs, we also consider the ratio of under-estimates to 
over-estimates of desired frequency of intake, shown in the rightmost column of Table 1. Under 
pluralistic ignorance, these ratios should follow the norm. That is, if a norm favouring intake is not 
actually internalised but is believed to be, this should cause overestimates of its desired frequency of 
intake. Conversely, in the corresponding circumstances, a norm against a food item would result in 
systematic underestimates of its desired rate of consumption. The consistency of the results with this 
pattern is striking. We do not offer a statistical test for this, however, as it was not pre-planned. 
Overall, 26/30 pupils under-rated the popularity of healthy foods in rows 3-6 of Table 1 more often 
than they over-rated it, compared to just 1/30 who over-rated it more often. The corresponding 
figures for unhealthy foods are 1/30 and 29/30 respectively. 
 
5. Discussion 
Our results provide evidence of pluralistic ignorance one food item, and are directionally consistent 
with this phenomenon for most items tested. Norms consistently favour unhealthy items and 
disfavour healthy ones. Preferences in some cases favour healthy items or disfavour unhealthy ones, 
but pupils seem generally to believe that preferences and norms are aligned. It will therefore be likely 
that pupils often make choices that do not reflect their own preferences, in order to conform. This 
would be consistent with the view of the headmaster (personal communication) that the children in 
some sense agree that they ought to be making healthy choices, and understand which choices are 
healthier, but typically fail to do so at school. It may also explain childrens’ underestimation of peers’ 
intake of healthy food (section 1). An exception to the general pattern of results is microwave ready- 
meals, an unhealthy item where the norm is unfavourable. In this case however, the item is not 
consumed at school. So this may be a parental, rather than peer group, norm. 
 Our interpretation involves an assumption about causality, that norms drive behaviour and 
beliefs about preferences, which cannot be directly inferred from survey data. The prior likelihood is 
strong that norms influence behaviour, however (Edgerton, 1985), and such influence seems to imply 
belief in their internalisation, to underpin compliance and enforcement. The implications are that 
campaigns directed at children need to address the social norm, not merely information about health 
characteristics of food or the importance of healthy eating. 
Our questionnaire also collected some information regarding perceived choices. We asked 
children whether they tried to “fit in” when choosing food. Although less than 20% of pupils answered 
positively in Answer, over 40% of pupils predicted a positive answer in Guess, indicating a widespread 
perception of norm compliance by others 
From a public health policy perspective, a misperceived discrepancy between self and others 
opens up the potential to influence young people’s diets by modifying the perceived norm through 
making public the true distribution of behaviours and peer group attitudes. Our results indicate that 
salads, fizzy drinks and cakes would be among appropriate cases to concentrate on. The logic behind 
such intervention is to lower social pressure to conform by showing that personal attitudes and 
behaviour are shared in the group and therefore acceptable. This should also reduce the perceived 
universality of norms and therefore their prescriptive power (Prentice and Miller, 1993). Examples of 
successful interventions based on the correction of misperceptions of social norms can be found for 
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alcohol misuse among university students (DeJong et al., 2006; Perkins et al., 2010) and for intake of 
salads and burgers in a college canteen (Mollen et al., 2013). 
 
6. Conclusions 
We find misperceptions of preferences, with children systematically under-rating attractiveness of 
healthy items and over-rating that of unhealthy items. The bias is generally consistent with a perceived 
alignment of norms and preferences, against healthier items and in favour of less healthy items. A 
tendency to overestimate the internalisation of food norms would explain our results. A pronounced 
form of this whereby the norm is generally not internalised, but is generally believed to be, is pluralistic 
ignorance. This fits the directional pattern of results in 50% of the cases tested, and there is significant 
evidence for it in one case. Many pupils also report that others attempt to fit in when choosing food. 
The pattern of results suggests there may be potential for modifying norms to favour healthier diets, 
by making public the distribution of pupils’ reported preferences. Future research might also 
investigate the variation of food norms across different socio-economic contexts, or evaluate 
interventions intended to modify food norms directly. 
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Appendix: Questionnaire 
The questionnaire has different versions, for use in the 2 protocols. The one below (p11) is the 
Coordinate version, used in the Coordinate and Answer protocol. The Answer and Guess versions are 
identical except for the opening paragraph. The alternative opening paragraphs are: 
 
for Answer (following Coordinate): 
“What is your own answer? 
Please answer all the questions. This time we would just like to know your own answer to each 
question.” 
 
for Answer (before Guess): 
“Please answer all the questions. 
We’re going to run a competition with prizes, so don’t let anyone see what you are writing. For each 
question we just want to know your own answer. But when everyone is finished, we will use the 
answers to make a quiz. We will mark some of the quiz questions. Three HMV vouchers worth £10 will 
be won by pupils who get those questions right.” 
 
for Guess: 
“What was the most common answer? 
It’s a competition, so don’t let anyone see what you are writing. For each question, you have to guess 
what the most common answer was in the room. When everyone is finished, we will choose some 
questions to see what the most common answers really were. Three HMV vouchers worth £10 will be 
won by pupils who guessed correctly in those questions.”  
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What will the most common answer be? 
Please answer all the questions. It’s a competition, so don’t let anyone see what you 
are writing. You have to guess what the most common answer will be in the room. 
When everyone is finished, we will choose some questions to see what the most 
common answers really are. Three HMV vouchers worth £10 will be won by pupils 
who guessed correctly in those questions.  
 
1. For lunch tomorrow I would like to have __________ (one word). 
 
2. When you are choosing food at school, do you want to fit in with how other 
kids are eating?       
Yes / No 
 
3. How cool is each meal? (1=very uncool, 2=uncool, 3=cool 4=really cool) 
 
a)  Chilli con carne      1 2 3 4 
 
b)  Salad with cold chicken and new potatoes  1 2 3 4 
 
c)  Beef burger with chips    1 2 3 4 
 
d)  Fish and chips      1 2 3 4 
 
e)  Vegetable lasagne with salad    1 2 3 4 
 
 
4. How attractive is each meal?  
(1=totally unattractive, 2=unattractive, 3=attractive, 4= very attractive) 
 
a) A meal cooked by my parents at home  1 2 3 4 
 
b) A meal in a burger chain in town   1 2 3 4 
 
c) A meal in a fancy restaurant in town   1 2 3 4 
 
d) A school meal      1 2 3 4 
 
5. on a scale of 1 to 4, rate the following meals or food items, where  
 
1= something I don’t want to have at all 
2= something I don’t want to have often 
3= something I want to have from time to time 
4= something I want to have often 
 
a) a glass of milk     1 2 3 4 
 
b) a beef burger from a fast food chain  1 2 3 4 
 
c) a veggie burger    1 2 3 4 
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1= something I don’t want to have at all 
2= something I don’t want to have often 
3= something I want to have from time to time 
4= something I want to have often 
 
d) a microwave ready meal   1 2 3 4 
 
e) a portion of cooked vegetables  1 2 3 4 
 
f) a large fizzy drink    1 2 3 4 
 
g) an apple     1 2 3 4 
 
h) a large slice of cake    1 2 3 4 
 
i) a salad with lettuce and cucumber  1 2 3 4 
 
j) tomato ketchup    1 2 3 4 
 
k) a home-made beef burger    1 2 3 4 
 
l) a glass of carrot juice    1 2 3 4 
 
m) chips      1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
6. A boy called Tom gets out his packed lunch and eats it in the playground, but 
he does not take out his apple because he does not want to be seen eating it. 
Tom’s  behaviour is  
 
a) stupid   b) unwise   c) understandable  d) cool 
 
 
7. A boy called Steve gets out his packed lunch and eats it in the playground, 
where everyone can see him. He takes out his apple and some older boys come 
along, make fun of him and push him around because he is eating an apple.  
Steve’s behaviour is  
 
a) stupid   b) unwise   c) understandable  d) cool 
 
 
8. A boy called Jim gets out his packed lunch and eats it in the playground, 
where everyone can see him. He takes out his apple and a gang of older boys 
come along, make fun of him and push him around because he is eating an 
apple.  
The gang’s behaviour is 
 
a) stupid   b) unwise   c) understandable  d) cool  
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9. A group of kids are eating some snacks in the school playground. They drop 
all the packaging and empty drinks cans on the ground instead of putting it in 
the bin nearby. Their behaviour is 
 
a) stupid   b) unwise   c) understandable  d) cool 
 
 
10. A girl takes her bag into the toilet with her. She gets out her packed lunch and 
takes out a slice of cake. She eats the cake in the toilet, so that the other girls 
will not see her eating it. Her behaviour is  
 
a) stupid  b) unwise  c) understandable d) cool 
 
 
11. A girl takes her packed lunch into the school canteen. After eating her 
sandwiches, she gets out a large slice of cake. A group of girls at her table see 
this and start talking about how to keep slim, how ‘disgusting it is to stuff your 
face with sweet food’, and how ‘some girls are just, like, these uncontrolled 
binge cake eaters’. The group’s behaviour is  
 
b) stupid  b) unwise  c) understandable d) cool  
 
